Midterm Possibilities Consume Congressional Agenda

With control of Congress increasingly uncertain heading into the November 2026 midterm elections, the Trump Administration has begun opening lines of communication with Democratic leaders who could hold substantially greater power in Washington next year.

President Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner recently met in New York with House Democratic Leader Hakeem Jeffries, who would be the leading candidate for Speaker if Democrats capture the House. The Associated Press characterized the meeting as “a signal that the White House is seeking ways to work with Democrats” should Republicans lose their House majority.

The discussion reportedly included housing, immigration and the high cost of living, and Kushner suggested a follow-up meeting between Jeffries and White House Chief of Staff Susie Wiles.

The chasm between the two sides seems so wide that it is difficult to imagine passage of meaningful trade legislation for at least a year if the majority in either chamber changes in November.

Neither side is portraying the outreach as a political alliance. Jeffries subsequently said Kushner “asked for a meeting, and I took it, to discuss the affordability crisis,” while simultaneously promising aggressive oversight of the Administration if Democrats win the House. “No one is going to get a pass,” Jeffries said.

At the same time, he emphasized that Americans expect Washington to solve problems, adding, “I’m not simply here to make a point, but I’m also here to make a difference.” The combination of confrontation and willingness to negotiate provides an early indication of what divided government could look like during the final two years of the Trump presidency.

The Administration has reason to prepare for that possibility. Republicans currently control the Senate 53-47, counting the two Independents who caucus with Democrats as part of the Democratic bloc. In the House, the Republican majority is considerably narrower, with 218 Republicans, 212 Democrats, one Independent and four vacancies as of late August. All 435 House seats are before voters in November, while Democrats would need a net gain of four Senate seats to take outright control of the upper chamber. The Senate remains the more difficult target, but both chambers are sufficiently competitive that businesses engaged in international trade should be preparing for several possible congressional configurations in 2027.

Trade policy could become one of the most important areas of disagreement under a Democratic House. Ways and Means Committee Democrats have sharply criticized the Administration’s reliance on executive tariff authorities, particularly following the Supreme Court’s rejection of the Administration’s use of IEEPA tariffs. Ranking Member Richard Neal has accused the Administration of searching for new statutory mechanisms to continue imposing tariffs and has argued that the country needs “a coherent trade strategy” rather than repeated changes in tariff authority. A Democratic majority would give those views considerably greater institutional weight through committee leadership, hearings, investigations and control over which trade legislation advances through the House.

The clearest indication of the potential change is emerging from congressional proposals to reclaim authority over tariffs. Senate Finance Committee Ranking Member Ron Wyden has introduced the Congressional Trade Powers Reform Act of 2026, which would require congressional approval of presidential tariff actions, establish a bicameral Joint Committee on Tariffs and Trade, clarify that binding trade agreements require congressional approval, and increase congressional oversight of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. “Congress must reassert its authority over trade and tariffs,” Wyden said, arguing that no president should be able to “unilaterally change the worldwide economy at the click of a button.”

That debate is already affecting legislation in the current Congress. Democrats have supported stronger sanctions against Russia but objected to provisions granting President Trump broad authority to impose tariffs against major purchasers of Russian energy. Neal declared after Senate passage that legislation granting additional tariff power to the President “will not stand in the House,” while Wyden argued that Congress should impose sanctions without handing the President discretion to determine which trading partners are tariffed or exempted. A Democratic-controlled House in 2027 would make similar delegations of new tariff authority substantially more difficult to enact.

The 2026 USMCA review provides another important indication of where bipartisan cooperation—and conflict—could emerge. Ways and Means Democrats have called for stronger provisions addressing offshoring, worker rights, environmental protection, economic security and enforcement while reaffirming the trilateral North American trading relationship. In their May letter to the Administration, committee Democrats called the review “a crucial opportunity to fortify the North American economic relationship and the resiliency of the U.S. economy,” while stating that “House Democrats stand ready to work with your office.”

Meanwhile, USTR negotiations with Mexico have already focused on steel and aluminum, automobiles, economic security, labor, agriculture, customs and trade facilitation, among other issues.

If Republicans retain the Senate while Democrats capture the House, major trade legislation in 2027 would require bipartisan negotiation. The most viable legislative opportunities would consequently be measures capable of attracting support from both parties—including customs modernization, supply-chain security, enforcement against forced labor and transshipment, economic-security measures, and targeted reforms benefiting domestic manufacturing.

A Democratic sweep of both chambers would have more significant consequences. Democrats would control both House Ways and Means and Senate Finance—the two committees with primary jurisdiction over trade—and would be positioned to advance legislation restricting presidential tariff authority and increasing congressional oversight of USTR and trade agreements. Even then, however, President Trump would retain the veto, and most ordinary Senate legislation would continue to face the chamber’s 60-vote procedural threshold on filibusters. The practical result could therefore be greater congressional oversight and substantially more pressure on executive trade policy without necessarily producing a reversal of existing tariffs.